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NOTES 
RETHINKING SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT IN 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT CONTEXT 
The Selective Service System's "passive enforcement" of the most recent 
draft registration law has called attention to the defense of selective prosecu- 
tion. Under a passive enforcement policy, an enforcement agency makes no 
effort to discover violators, but refers to the Justice Department for prosecu- 
tion only those violators who turn themselves in by writing a letter of protest 
to the government, or who are turned in by third parties.' The effect of such a 
policy is to select for prosecution only those who have openly criticized the 
government and indicated their noncompliance as evidence of the intensity of 
their ~pposi t ion.~ Quiet offenders are for all practical purposes rendered 
immune from prose~ution.~ In practice, passive enforcement makes registra- 
tion itself voluntary, but criticism of the registration program a crime. 
Under the current law of selective prosecution a claim that the practice 
violates the first amendment4 has little chance of success. Nearly every circuit 
applies a two-part test for the defense of selective prosecution under which the 
defendant must show not only disproportionate selection but a prosecutorial 
motive to punish or deter the exercise of first amendment rights. Such a 
motive is nearly impossible to establish since the Selective Service can justify 
the passive enforcement policy on three nonspeech grounds: cost-savings, the 
deterrence value of prosecuting the visible offender, and the evidentiary value 
of public statements. The tension between the motive test and the first amend- 
ment values implicated by passive enforcement has led to inconsistent determi- 
nations in courts reviewing the Selective Service p01icy.~ While the Ninth 
Circuit has resolved the tension in favor of the traditional motive test, the 
1. See United States v. Wayte, 549 F. Supp. 1376, 1379 (C.D. Cal. 1982), rev'd, 710 F.2d 
1385 (9th Cir. 1983). The Selective Service System has since abandoned passive enforcement and 
now identifies violators by using social security and driver's license records. See N.Y. Times, June 
30, 1983, at  D23, col. 4. 
2. United States v. Wayte, 549 F. Supp. 1376, 1379 & n.3 (C.D. Cal. 1982), rev'd, 710 F.2d 
1385 (9th Cir. 1983). 
3. Id. at  1384. 
4. The first amendment reads in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to 
petition the Government for a redress of grievances . . . ." U.S. Const. amend. I. 
5. Compare United States v. Wayte, 710 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983) (rejecting inference of 
motive), and United States v. Eklund, 551 F. Supp. 964 (S.D. Iowa 1982) (failure to establish 
motive), with United States v. Schmucker, No. 82-3701 (6th Cir. Nov. 25, 1983) (available on 
LEXIS, Genfed library, Cir file) (recognizing that passive enforcement may be a guise for 
suppressing criticism), and United States v. Wayte, 549 F. Supp. 1376 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (inference 
of motive), rev'd, 710 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983). 
144 
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Sixth Circuit has resolved the tension in favor of short-circuiting the motive 
test.e 
This Note argues for the use of a balancing-of-interests approach in place 
of the current two-part test when enforcement policies are challenged on first 
amendment grounds. The Note begins by explaining the current two-part test 
and analyzing how it conflicts with other first amendment doctrines. Next, an 
inquiry into the development of current law reveals that the origins of both the 
selective prosecution defense and its motive requirement lie in equal protec- 
tion review of administrative action. These roots suggest a defect in the 
application of an equal protection test in place of a direct application of the 
first amendment. The Note then examines both equal protection and agency 
review applications of the motive requirement and concludes that neither 
model of review supports a motive requirement for a first amendment chal- 
lenge to federal enforcement policy. Finally, the Note subjects the passive 
enforcement policy to first amendment analysis. The policy violates the first 
amendment whether it is assessed as a content-based or as a content-neutral 
regulation of speech. 
I. THE TENSION BETWEEN SELECTIVE PROSECUTION A D 
FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSES 
A. Role of Prosecutorial Motive in Current Selective Prosecution Analysis 
Currently, a selective prosecution defense will be successful only if the 
defendant shows both selection and that such selection is motivated by a 
hostility to the defendant or his exercise of constitutional rights. This test has 
been applied to free speech claims. In all other first amendment contexts, 
however, the courts do not require a showing of hostile motives to sustain a 
challenge to government action. This conflict between the selective prosecu- 
tion motive requirement and general first amendment analysis makes clear the 
need for a reexamination of first amendment-selective prosecution analysis. 
The Supreme Court has never sustained a defense based on selective 
prosecution. Nevertheless, in byler v.  bole^,^ a 1962 case rejecting such a 
defense, the Court suggested that in the proper case the defense was avail- 
able.8 Following this dictum, nearly every circuit has adopted the defense of 
selective prosecution and a two-part test for applying While both parts 
6. Compare United States v. Wayte, 710 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983) (valid justifications defeat 
inference of motive), with United States v. Schmucker, No. 82-3701 (6th Cir. Nov. 25, 1983) 
(available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Cir file) (defense could be made out without direct showing 
of motive). 
7. 368 U.S. 448 (1962). 
8. Id. at 456; see also Two Guys, Inc. v. McGinIey, 366 U.S. 582, 588 (1961) (noting in 
dictum that selective prosecution would be a defense). 
9. E.g., United States v. Bourque, 541 F.2d 290 (1st Cir. 1976); United States v. Berrios, 501 
F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Johnson, 577 F.2d 1304 (5th Cir. 1978); United States 
v. Hazel, 696 F.2d 473 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Peskin, 527 F.2d 71 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied. 929 U.S. 818 (1976); United States v. Ojala, 544 F.2d 940 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. 
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have their roots in the Oyler opinion,1° an oft-cited articulation of the test 
appears in the 1974 Second Circuit opinion in United States v. Berrios:ll 
To support a defense of selective or discriminatory prosecution, 
the defendant bears the heavy burden of establishing, at least prima 
facie, (1) that, while others similarly situated have not generally been 
proceeded against because of conduct of the type forming the basis 
of the charge against him, he has been singled out for prosecution, 
and (2) that the government's discriminatory selection of him for 
prosecution has been invidious or in bad faith, i.e., based upon such 
impermissible considerations as race, religion, or the desire to pre- 
vent his exercise of constitutional rights.12 
The first part of the Berrios test is the self-evident threshold requirement 
that some selection have taken place. If the government has prosecuted all 
offenders, there can be no claim of selective prosecution. Nevertheless, this 
part of the test is more easily stated than applied. Courts disagree on whether 
the defense requires: (1) proof only that other violators were not prosecuted,I3 
(2) proof that other violators were not prosecuted and that the government 
knew generally that there were other  violator^,'^ or (3) proof that other 
individual violators were known to the government but not prosecuted.ls Also 
unclear is whether a defendant must show that only members of the impermis- 
sible class were prosecuted, or merely that a disproportionate number of vocal 
violators were prosecuted.16 
The second part of the Berrios test is more directly related to prosecuto- 
rial motive, and its application has been more problematic. The most liberal 
Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
For discussions of the selective prosecution doctrine, see generally Cardinale & Feldman, The 
Federal Courts and the Right to Nondiscriminatory Administration of the Criminal Law: A 
Critical View, 29 Syracuse L. Rev. 659 (1978); Note, United States v. Falk: Developments in the 
Defense of Discriminatory Prosecution, 72 Mich. L. Rev. 1113 (1974); Comment, The Right to 
Nondiscriminatory Enforcement of State Penal Laws, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 1103 (1961). 
10. See infra text accompanying notes 57-59. 
11. 501 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1974). 
12. Id. at 1211. 
13. Cf. United States v. Hazel, 696 F.2d 473 (6th Cir. 1983) (allegation only that 34 other 
violators were not prosecuted sufficient basis to get evidentiary hearing). 
14. See United States v. Wayte, 710 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983) (evidence that estimated 
500,000 violators not prosecuted sufficient to meet first part of test without evidence that 
government knew of other individuals). 
15. See United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1974) (allegation that other violators 
existed without identifying any individuals fails first part of test). The Oyler Court's initial 
rejection of the selective prosecution claim was based on defendant's failure to allege "more than 
a failure to prosecute others because of a lack of knowledge of their prior offenses." Oyler v. 
Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962). This language supports the most stringent test of knowledge of 
individual violators. 
16. Compare United States v. Scott, 521 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1975) (tax fraud; first test not 
satisfied because of vigorous IRS general enforcement policy), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976), 
with United States v. Hazel, 696 F.2d 473 (6th Cir. 1983) (tax fraud; first test satisfied by 
allegation of 34 violators not prosecuted). 
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phrasing of the test for unconstitutional selection criteria-"based upon im- 
permissible grounds such as . . . the exercise of constitutional rights"l7- 
suggests the possibility of the defense when the prosecutor selected the defend- 
ant on the basis of good-faith but constitutionally unsound distinctions. 
However, the Berrios formulation, which requires a showing that selection is 
"invidious or in bad faith, i.e., based upon such impermissible considerations 
as . . . the desire to prevent his exercise of constitutional rights,"ls is more 
common. Courts often require showings of "reprisal"l9 or "desire to penal- 
i~e."~O These tests require a showing of personal hostility on the part of the 
prosecutorial decisionmaker, towards either the defendant or the constitu- 
tional right exercised. For example, even if the defendant can show that his 
exercise of first amendment rights is the but-for cause of his selection for 
prosecution, the defense is denied if the prosecution was not "made in retalia- 
tion for his exercise of his first amendment rightYy2l but rather "rests upon the 
amount of publicity [his] protests receive[, which] . . . serves a legitimate 
governmental interest in promoting public ~ompliance."~~ 
This harsh motive requirement is mitigated somewhat by two procedural 
devices that have been built into the selective prosecution law. First, a defend- 
ant can shift the burden of proof to the prosecutor if he establishes a prima 
facie case of selective prosecution by alleging improper motive and introduc- 
ing evidence raising a reasonable doubt as to the prosecutor's good faith.23 
Second, a defendant alleging facts sufficient to take the selective prosecution 
defense "past the frivolous stage" may get court-ordered discovery of docu- 
ments related to prosecutorial policy, in preparation for an evidentiary hear- 
ing on the defense.24 Since the prosecutor is often unwilling to take the stand 
17. United States v. Wilson, 639 F.2d 500, 503 (9th Cir. 1981); accord United States v. 
Murdock, 548 F.2d 599, 600 (5th Cir. 1977). Both these courts found that the defense failed to 
pass even this liberal test. In no reported decision has a defendant succeeded under this liberal 
standard. But cf. United States v. Schmucker, No. 82-3701 (6th Cir. Nov. 25, 1983) (available on 
LEXIS. Genfed library, Cir file) (defense may be made out by causal relation between exercise of 
right and prosecution). 
18. Berrios, 501 F.2d at 1211. 
19. United States v. Ojala, 544 F.2d 940, 944 (8th Cir. 1976). 
20. United States v. Peskin, 527 F.2d 71, 86 (7th Cir. 1975). 
21. United States v. Catlett, 584 F.2d 864, 867 (8th Cir. 1978). 
22. Id. at 868. 
23. See, e.g., United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973) (memorandum indicating 
strict enforcement against draft protestors raises reasonable doubt as to motive); United States v. 
Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972) (inferential proof of individual knowledge of nonvocal 
violators is prima facie case). The student author of Note, supra note 9, at 1114, read Falk as 
"implicitly eliminating the necessity of showing purposeful discrimination . . . represent[ing] an 
important and praiseworthy development." This praise may have been a bit premature; the 
"purposeful" requirement lives on. E-g., United States v. Catlett, 584 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1978). 
24. E.g., United States v. Oaks, 508 F.2d 1403, 1404 (9th Cir. 1974). The decision whether to 
grant such an evidentiary hearing has been held to be a matter of trial court discretion. United 
States v. Wilson, 639 F.2d 500,503 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1212 
(2d Cir. 1974). 
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on the question of good faith, or to release sensitive  document^,^^ a prima 
facie case or nonfrivolous allegation can result in dismissal.26 
Both the prima facie case and the nonfrivolous allegation, however, are 
subject to rebuttal where the government shows that the challenged policy is 
not motivated by an invidious desire to punish, but rather some rational 
prosecutorial goal. Although the Selective Service and the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) both have officially acknowledged policies that tend to direct 
extra prosecutorial effort toward those who vocally oppose draft registrationz7 
or the income tax,28-ordinarily enough to establish a prima facie casez0- 
selective prosecution claims based on these policies have been rejected where 
the government established noninvidious reasons for the Prosecutors 
advance three justifications for prosecuting the vocal offender. First, they 
suggest that the greater media attention received in such prosecutions has a 
greater deterrent effect on would-be  violator^.^^ A second frequently advanced 
justification is the need to allocate limited resources and the lower cost of 
discovering vocal  offender^.^^ The third justification focuses on the mens rea 
element of the crime charged: it is easier to establish a knowing33 or "will- 
f ~ 1 " ~ ~  violation if the defendant has made public statements about his refusal 
to comply with the law.35 
These three justifications are properly dispositive of a defense based on 
prosecutorial motive. Yet a court faced with the juxtaposition of the values 
served by these justifications-in terrorem effects on would-be violators, cost 
savings, and more easily won cases-and the values invoked by the first 
25. Of course, in camera inspection may be available. See United States v. Oaks, 508 F.2d 
1403 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1212-13 (2d Cir. 1974). 
26. E.g., United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972) (failure to rebut prima facie 
case requires dismissal); United States v. Wayte, 549 F. Supp. 1376 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (dismissal for 
failure to cooperate in discovery), rev'd, 710 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983). Dismissal as a discovery 
sanction has been criticized. See Attorney General v. Irish People, Inc., 684 F.2d 928 (D.C. Cir. 
1982). 
27. See United States v. Wayte, 549 F. Supp. 1376, 1382 (C.D. Cal. 1982), rev'd, 710 F.2d 
1385 (9th Cir. 1983). 
28. See United States v. Catlett, 584 F.2d 864, 866 n.5 (8th Cir. 1978). 
29. See United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 621-22 (7th Cir. 1973) (policy statement 
establishes prima facie case). 
30. United States v. Catlett, 584 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1978) (tax protestor); United States v. 
Eklund, 551 F. Supp. 964 (S.D. Iowa 1982) (draft nonregistrant). 
31. See, e.g., United States v. Hazel, 696 F.2d 473 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Catlett, 
584 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1978). 
32. United States v. Wayte, 549 F. Supp. 1376, 1384 (C.D. Cal. 1982), rev'd, 710 F.2d 1385 
(9th Cir. 1983); cf. United States v. Ojala, 544 F.2d 940 (8th Cir. 1976) (limited enforcement 
resources support deterrence argument). 
33. 50 U.S.C. app. 5 462 (1976) (selective service law). 
34. 26 U.S.C. 5 7203 (1976) (Internal Revenue Code). 
35. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 639 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating that a tax 
protestor provides the strongest case for meeting the "willful" requirement); cf. United States V. 
Eklund, 551 F. Supp. 964 (S.D. Iowa 1982) (selective prosecution defense rejected because passive 
enforcement policy had the purpose of separating out the willful nonregistrants). 
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amendment-the political expression that is "the essence of self govern- 
ment"3B-might understandably pause before rejecting the selective prosecu- 
tion defense. Such was the reaction of the District Court for the Central 
District of California in United States v. W ~ y t e . ~ ~  Confronted with a policy 
that selected for prosecution only vocal draft nonregistrants, the court re- 
jected both the cost-saving and deterrence justifications. The court clung to its 
inference of bad faith from the government's knowledge of the consequences 
of passive enfor~ement .~~ In United States v. S ~ h m u c k e r , ~ ~  the Sixth Circuit 
showed a similar sensitivity to first amendment values and, based on the 
government's knowledge of the consequences of passive enforcement, re- 
manded a draft conviction for dismissal unless the government could demon- 
strate nondiscriminatory enforcement. In the Wayte case on appeal, however, 
the Ninth Circuit rejected this sort of inference as "clearly erroneous" and 
reversed the d i smi~sa l .~~  This disagreement among courts reviewing the passive 
enforcement policy underscores the tension between first amendment values, 
which do not generally depend on the motive of the government actor disturb- 
ing them, and a test that turns on the personal motive of the prosecutorial 
decisionmaker. 
B. The Irrelevance of Motive in First Amendment Analysis 
The tension between the two-part selective prosecution test and first 
amendment doctrine becomes apparent when one considers courts' reluctance 
to consider the government's motive in first amendment cases. Courts often 
refuse to look into the motive behind legi~lation.~~ In the freedom of expres- 
sion context, these refusals to consider motive are not based merely on the 
Court's reluctance to "psychoanalyze" C o n g r e s ~ , ~ ~  but rather on a sense that 
good motives are irrelevant if first amendment interests are affected. 
Good motives do not generally save government action that otherwise 
violates the first amendment. In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. P a t t e r ~ o n , ~ ~  the 
36. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964) (Brennan, J.). 
37. 549 F. Supp. 1376 (C.D. Cal. 1982), rev'd, 710 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983). 
38. Id. at 1382. Contra United States v. Eklund, 551 F. Supp. 964 (S.D. Iowa 1982). 
39. No. 82-3701 (6th Cir. Nov. 25, 1983) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Cir file). The 
Schmucker court remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to allow the government to 
attempt to prove its good faith. 
40. United States v. Wayte, 710 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1983). 
41. E.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) ("Inquiries into congressional 
motives or purposes are a hazardous matter."); Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423,455 (1931); 
McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27,56 (1904). This reluctance to consider legislative motive has 
disappeared in certain areas. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. 
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (equal protection); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) 
(establishment clause); infra text accompanying notes 90-93. See generally L. Tribe, American 
Constitutional Law 594-98 (1978); Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitu- 
tional Law, 79 Yale L.J. 1205 (1970). 
42. United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 299 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting). 
43. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
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Supreme Court struck down a civil contempt citation for the NAACP's failure 
to comply with a court-ordered disclosure of its membership lists. Such disclo- 
sure would have had an adverse effect on the NAACP's members' first 
amendment right of association. The Court sought to discover the extent of 
NAACP activity within Alabama in order to adjudicate the NAACP's compli- 
ance with the Alabama foreign corporation law.44 Since the court order's 
underlying objective was not the suppression of rights, it would certainly 
survive the "desire to prevent [the] exercise of constitutional rights" test 
applied under selective prosecution analysis.45 In striking the order down, the 
Court refused to draw a distinction between scrutiny of legislative and judicial 
acts.4e Noting that "[tlhe governmental action challenged may appear to be 
totally unrelated to protected libertiesYH4' Justice Harlan wrote for the Court: 
"In the domain of these indispensable liberties, whether of speech, press, or 
association, the decisions of this Court recognize that abridgment of such 
rights, even though unintended, may inevitably follow from varied forms of 
governmental action."48 Thus, a valid purpose for a governmental, including 
a nonlegislative, act does not immunize the act from first amendment scru- 
tiny.49 
If this same approach applies to prosecutorial policies that impinge on 
first amendment interests, the courts are wrong to end selective prosecution 
analysis once a valid motivation is shown. When confronted with a first 
amendment selective prosecution defense, a court must choose between settled 
44. Id. at  451. 
45. United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974). 
46. 357 U.S. at  463. 
47. Id. at  461. 
48. Id. (citing American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950)). Last Tcrm, 
the Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule of NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson ihat good 
motives do not save legislation that violates first amendment rights. In Minneapolis Star & 
Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 103 S. Ct. 1365 (1983), the Court struck down a 
use tax on large users of paper and ink: 
We need not and do not impugn the motives of the Minnesota legislature in passing 
the ink and paper tax. Illicit legislative intent is not thesine qua non of a violation of the 
First Amendment . . . [citing NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, among others]. We 
have long recognized that even regulations aimed at proper governmental concerns can 
restrict unduly the exercise of rights protected by the First Amendment. 
Id. at  1376 (citations omitted). 
49. In the last Term the Supreme Court suggested that a motive hostile to speech is a 
sufficient, but not necessary, condition for invalidating a statute regulating speech. Minneapolis 
Star &Tribune Co. v. ~Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 103 S. Ct. 1365, 1369 (1983) (dictum). 
While Minneapolis Star suggests that a motive hostile to speech interests invalidates a 
governmental act, such a rule provides no support for the motive requirement in the selective 
prosecution defense. To say that an otherwise valid prosecutorial policy may be struck down if 
unconstitutionally motivated-a proposition that is entirely consistent with the current two-part 
test-does not require that prosecutorial policy be relieved of all constitutional scrutiny if not so 
motivated. Even while resurrecting the potential for striking down legislation based on a motive 
hostile to speech, the Supreme Court was careful to state that good motives do not shicld 
governmental acts from first amendment scrutiny. Id. at 1376. 
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selective prosecution law, which requires the motive showing, and settled 
freedom of expression precedent, which does not. The resolution of this 
conflict requires a reexamination of the source and justifications for the 
motive requirement. 
A review of the cases developing the selective prosecution defense reveals 
that the motive requirement has its roots in two diverse areas of law: suspect 
class equal protection analysis and judicial review of administrative action. A 
close consideration of equal protection analysis, however, reveals the inappli- 
cability of a motive requirement to first amendment claims. Similarly, the 
reasoning behind the consideration of motive in challenges to administrative 
action collapses when applied to prosecutorial policy. In first amendment 
challenges to broadly applied policy, the focus turns to discovering the nature 
of that policy rather than its underlying motive. 
A. The Roots of Selective Prosecution Analysis in Equal Protection Analysis 
A review of the development of selective prosecution law reveals that the 
motive requirement's roots lie in equal protection review of administrative 
action. This perspective explains the courts' failure to look beyond the equal 
protection framework to a direct first amendment test that would disregard 
motive. 
1. Equal Protection Review of the ~nconstituti'onal Administration of 
Valid Laws: from Yick Wo to Oyler. - Since the decision to prosecute is a 
form of discretionary executive action, the selective prosecution defense con- 
stitutes judicial review of administrative action.50 Such review draws on equal 
protection analysis of unequal application of neutral laws. 
The current approach to selective prosecution analysis traces its origins to 
Yick Wo v. HopkinsYs1 the first case in which the Supreme Court struck down 
a facially valid statute because of its unconstitutional administration. San 
Francisco had passed an ordinance banning the conduct of a laundry business 
in a wooden building, unless a permit were first obtained from the Board of 
Supervisors. As a fire prevention regulation, the ordinance was facially valid. 
However, of the 200 Chinese who applied not one was granted a permit, while 
all but one of the whites applying received permits. The Court struck the law 
down as a denial of equal protection, finding the discretion granted to the 
Board to be "naked and arbitrary power":52 
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, 
yet, if it is applied and administered by public authorities with an 
50. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 577 F.2d 1304 (5th Cir. 1978). 
51. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
52. Id. at 366. 
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evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and 
illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, ma- 
terial to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the 
prohibition of the Cons t i tu t i~n .~~  
The Court required the release of those prosecuted and convicted for violating 
the law. 
Yick Wo's relevance to a claim that a policy of selective prosecution 
impinges on first amendment rights is by no means self-evident. Yick Wo 
concerned the unequal administration of permits, not the selective prosecution 
of violators. It concerned class discrimination based on race, not individual 
selection based on the exercise of constitutional rights. Later cases, however, 
extended Yick Wo to both individual selection and criminal prosecution. 
In Snowden v. HughesYs4 the Court made clear that the reasoning of Yick 
Wo applied to individual administrative selection as well as class discrimina- 
tion. Snowden, the Republican primary runner-up in an Illinois state-house 
election primary, claimed a denial of equal protection when the election board 
failed to certify him as a candidate, contrary to a state statute. The Court 
rejected the equal protection claim not because the selection was individual, 
but because Snowden had failed to prove a hostile motive: there was "no 
allegation o f .  . . intentional or purposeful discrimination between persons or 
classes~"55 and thus no federally cognizable claim.5e 
In 1962, the Court first considered the selective prosecution defense in a 
criminal enforcement in Oyler v. Boles.57 The Court's reasoning makes clear 
the influence of Yick Wo's equal protection analysis.5s Oyler had been prose- 
cuted under a state habitual offender statute. He claimed that not every repeat 
offender was prosecuted under the harsher habitual offender statute, and that 
his selection was thus a denial of equal protection. The Court's rejection of his 
claim touched on both branches of the current two-part selective prosecution 
test. The Court first rejected Oyler's claim for failure to prove the prosecu- 
tor's knowledge that others were subject to the repeat offender statute, imply- 
ing the selective prosecution requirement that nonprosecution of others simi- 
larly situated be proved. The Court also rejected Oyler's claim for failure to 
show a hostile motive: 
53. Id. at 373-74. 
54. 321 U.S. 1 (1944). 
55. Id. at 7. 
56. Justice Stone's opinion also points out that a statute making such a selection would 
undoubtedly be valid under the equal protection clause. Id. at 11. 
57. 368 U.S. 448 (1962). The first suggestion that such purposeful discrimination might be a 
defense to a criminal prosecution came in 1961, in Two Guys, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U,S. 582 
(1961). There the Court rejected a petition to enjoin enforcement of a Sunday closing law based 
on expected selective application, stating that "[s]ince appellant's employees may defend against 
any such proceeding that is actually prosecuted on the ground of unconstitutional discrimination, 
we do not believe that the court below was incorrect in refusing to exercise its injunctive powers." 
Id. at 588-89. 
58. Oyler, 368 U.S. at 456. 
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Moreover, the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforce- 
ment is not in itself a federal constitutional violation. Even though 
the statistics in this case might imply a policy of selective enforce- 
ment, it was not stated that the selection was deliberately based 
upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbi- 
trary classification. Therefore, grounds supporting a finding of a 
denial of equal protection were not alleged.5g 
This language stands as the last pronouncement by the Supreme Court on 
the subject of selective prosecution. The "unjustifiable standard such as race, 
religion, or other arbitrary classification" test the Court posited is phrased in 
equal protection terms. Because Oyler involved a racial classification, the 
Supreme Court did not consider whether a different analysis is required when 
the defendant alleges that the selection abridges individual constitutional 
freedoms such as those protected by the first amendment.60 In addition, 
because the claim in Oyler involved selective prosecution by a state, the Court 
did not discuss whether the same inquiry was applicable for federal prosecu- 
tions. The lower courts were left to develop the appropriate approach to right- 
based claims of selective prosecution by federal officials. 
The circuit courts of appeals have expanded the defense of selective 
prosecution to encompass both federal prosecutions and claims that the selec- 
tion involved not a racial or arbitrary classification, but the violation of an 
individual constitutional right. These extensions, however, occurred within 
the framework of equal protection analysis. Though such cases involve a 
federal violation of a federal right, few courts have been able to see beyond 
the equal protection origins of the defense to apply the constitutional guaran- 
tee directly. 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia developed these 
extensions in two 1968 cases. In Washington v. United StatesYs1 the District of 
Columbia Circuit applied selective prosecution analysis to a federal criminal 
prosecution. The court held that the selective prosecution defense, derived 
from the fourteenth amendment guarantee of equal protection, was applicable 
to the federal government through the fifth amendment guarantee of due 
In Dixon v. District of C o l ~ r n b i a , ~ ~  Chief Judge Bazelon sustained a 
59. Id. at 456 (citing Snowden). 
60. The Oyler dictum has been read to be limited to situations of class rather than individual 
discrimination. Moss v. Hornig, 314 F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1963). But cf. Ely, supra note 41, at  
1228-30 (rejecting distinction on the ground that an individual is a class of one). Later Second 
Circuit cases ignored the Moss limitation, recognizing selective prosecution claims based on 
individual rights. See, e.g., United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 121 1 (2d Cir. 1974). 
61. 401 F.2d 915 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
62. Id. at  922-23. 
The court relied on Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). In Bolling, the companion case to 
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Supreme Court found that the due process 
guarantee required that equal protection guarantees apply to the District of Columbia just as they 
apply to the states in the school desegregation context. The Bolling Court left open the extent to 
which the fifth amendment embraces the fourteenth in other contexts. 347 U.S. at  499. Washing- 
ton extends Bolling to the criminal context. 
63. 394 F.2d 966 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
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claim of selective prosecution based on first amendment rightso4 Dixon had 
been harrassed by police officers when stopped for a traffic violation. He had 
initially agreed not to press the harassment claim in return for a promise not 
to prosecute the traffic violation. When Dixon changed his mind and filed a 
harassment complaint, the District prosecuted for the violation. Chief Judge 
Bazelon's opinion treated the harassment claim as a first amendment-pro- 
tected "petition for redress of  grievance^,"^^ concluding that such a retalia- 
tory prosecution is both a direct violation of the first amendment and a 
violation of the equal protection clause, made applicable to the federal gov- 
ernment by the due process clause.6o 
While the circuits have adopted Chief Judge Bazelon's extension of the 
selective prosecution defense to federally protected individual rights, the direct 
first amendment strand has been largely ignored. Instead, selective prosecu- 
tion claims-for federal as well as for state prosecutions-have been analyzed 
within the equal protection framework originally suggested by Oyler v. Boles. 
A typical statement of this approach appears in United States v. Crowthers:07 
For officials of the United States government to selectively and 
discriminatorily enforce [a regulation] so as to turn it into a scheme 
whereby activitites protected by the First Amendment are allowed or 
prohibited in the uncontrolled discretion of these officials violates 
the defendants' right to equal protection of the laws embraced 
within the due process of law clause of the Fifth Amendment.08 
Under this approach, the protection of first amendment rights applies to 
actions of the federal government since selection based on the exercise of such 
rights is an impermissible classification under fourteenth amendment equal 
protection, and equal protection is a component of the due process of law 
guaranteed by the fifth amendment. 
This equal protection approach fails to consider that the first amendment 
directly applies to actions of the federal government. The inclination of the 
courts to focus on the equal protection clause in selective prosecution cases- 
an approach that can be traced through Oyler back to Yick Wooo-has signifi- 
cant implications. Ordinary first amendment analysis does not require proof 
of the government's motive to infringe on the right-the fact of infringement 
64. Chief Judge Bazelon wrote an opinion in which neither of the other judges joined. Each 
of the two other judges submitted a separate opinion concurring in the result (dismissal with 
prejudice) only. Both judges concurred without reaching the selective prosecution claim, basing 
dismissal on the District's loss of interest in prosecuting the case. Chief Judge Bazelon's opinion, 
while appearing first in the reporter, thus represents a minority position. 
65. 394 F.2d at 968 (discussing U.S. Const. amend. I, cl. 6). 
66. Id. at 968 n.3. 
67. 456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1972). 
68. Id. at 1080; accord United States v. \Vilson, 639 F.2d 500,503-04 (9th Cir. 1981); United 
States v. Peskin, 527 F.2d 71, 86 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 818 (1976); United States 
v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1973) (en banc). 
69. See supra notes 57-67 and accompanying text. 
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is enough to sustain the claim.70 For most equal protection claims, however, 
the party challenging the governmental action must prove an intent to discrim- 
inate for impermissible reasons.71 First amendment-selective prosecution 
claims require an evaluation of the justifications for importing a motive 
requirement, either from equal protection jurisprudence or from some other 
body of law, rather than simply applying the first amendment directly. 
2. First Amendment-Equal Protection Analysis as a Source for the Mo- 
tive Requirement. - Inferences drawn from two lines of recent Supreme 
Court equal protection precedent can be pieced together to support the re- 
quirement in selective prosecution cases that the defendant show a govern- 
mental motive hostile to first amendment rights. For two reasons, however, 
this argument fails. First, equal protection jurisprudence provides no support 
for requiring such a motive when the classification infringes on a fundamental 
constitutional right. Second, the vulnerability of a first amendment right to 
federal infringement should not depend on whether the claim is analysed 
under the equal protection component of the fifth amendment or under the 
first amendment itself. 
In recent years the Supreme Court has made clear that, standing alone, a 
showing that a statute's application has a disparate impact on a protected class 
does not trigger heightened equal protection scrutiny-only purposeful dis- 
crimination merits such In a second line of cases, the Court has 
established that classifications that impinge on first amendment rights merit 
heightened equal protection review.73 While the Court has held that content- 
based distinctions warrant such review without regard to motive,74 it has left 
open the possibility of requiring motive where the administration of a neutral 
statute has the effect of chilling a first amendment right.75 Thus, an advocate 
70. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text. 
71. See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Washington v. Davis, 426 
U.S. 229 (1976). 
72. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 
(1976). 
73. The Supreme Court has held that discrimination based on the exercise of fundamental 
rights, such as first amendment rights, receives strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause. 
See, e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
74. In Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), the Supreme Court considered first 
amendment and equal protection challenges to a Chicago ordinance that barred picketing within 
150 feet of a public school, but exempted labor picketing from its prohibition. Finding the "equal 
protection claim . . . closely intertwined with First Amendment interests," id. at 95, the Court 
held that the content-based speech discrimination denied equal protection to the nonlabor pick- 
eter; the ordinance failed to satisfy strict scrutiny. Id. at 101-02. For a discussion of whether the 
passive enforcement policy is an explicit speech-based distinction like Moseiy or a neutral regula- 
tion having a speech-based disparate impact, see infra notes 124-34 and accompanying text. The 
Court's decision was made without reference to motive. 
75. While the Court has reviewed discrimination on the basis of the exercise of first amend- 
ment rights under strict scrutiny without regard to motive in cases in which the discrimination is 
based on a content-based distinction, see supra note 74, it has not addressed whether motive is 
relevant in cases such as those reviewing the passive enforcement policy in which the discrimina- 
tion is the result of a content-neutral regulation. 
H e i n o n l i n e  - -  84  C o l u m .  L. R e v .  1 5 5  1 9 8 4  
COLUMBIA LA W RE VIEW [Vol. 84: 144 
of the motive requirement in first amendment-selective prosecution cases 
might argue that just as disparate impact on suspect classes requires height- 
ened scrutiny only if wrongfully motivated, so too, disparate impact on 
speakers-the result of passive enforcement of an otherwise neutral statute- 
demands such scrutiny only if wrongfully motivated. 
This reasoning does not withstand close analysis. All of the Supreme 
Court's equal protection decisions establishing a motive requirement where 
the aggrieved party was able to show that the classification had a disparate 
impact involved discrimination against protected classes such as blacks and 
women. In applying the fundamental interest-as distinct from the suspect 
class-strand of equal protection analysis, the Court has drawn no distinc- 
tions between classifications that purposely infringe on a constitutional right 
and those that have the unintended effect of infringing on such a right. Dunn 
v. Blurn~te in ,~~ a right-to-travel case, illustrates this point. In Dunn, the Court 
sustained a challenge to durational residency requirements for state voting 
registration. The Court relied on the requirement's chilling effect on the right 
to travel to invoke heightened equal protection ~crutiny.'~ Such scrutiny was 
invoked despite the state's argument that there existed no motive hostile to 
interstate m i g r a t i ~ n . ~ ~  If hostile motive is not required to invalidate a govern- 
ment act with a disparate impact on the implied fundamental right to travel, 
certainly such a requirement should not apply to an infringement of the 
explicit guarantee of freedom of speech.7Q 
For an argument that the passive enforcement policy is a content-based regulation of speech, 
see infra notes 124-34 and accompanying text. 
76. 405 U.S. 330 (1972). 
77. Id. at 338-42 (alternate holding). The Court also found heightened scrutiny necessary 
because the regulation burdened the fundamental right to vote. 
78. Id. at 339. The state attempted to distinguish Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
Slzapiro had held that a durational residency requirement for welfare benefits, designed in part to 
deter the immigration of welfare recipients, constituted an unconstitutional infringement of the 
right to travel. The state argued, in Dunn, that a legislative motive hostile to the c~nstitutional 
right invoked was a necessary part of Shapiro's holding. The Dunn Court rejected this argument, 
striking down the residency requirement while accepting the lack of a motive hostile to the right to 
travel. 
79. Other cases involving fundamental interest-equal protection challenges support the con- 
clusion that motive is irrelevant to such analysis. See, e.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 66 
(1982) (Brennan, J. concurring) (heightened scrutiny applied to burden on right to travel without 
discussion of legislative motive hostile to travel); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (noting, 
in ballot filing fee case, the legitimate purpose of limiting number of names on ballot, but, 
nonetheless, striking down the law on equal protection grounds); cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 
U.S. 618 (1969) (welfare residency requirement challenged; state motivation to exclude indigents 
not dispositive, nor do legitimate objectives of statute bar application of strict scrutiny). In City 
of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 112-22 (1980), Justice Marshall, in dissent, stated that the 
discriminatory motivation requirement of Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), does not 
apply when a fundamental constitutional interest is impinged. The majority's disagreement with 
Marshall was not whether motive was relevant to fundamental interest equal protection, but 
whether a fundamental interest was in fact involved. 446 U.S. at 75-80. 
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In addition to the uniform body of contrary precedent, a second argu- 
ment undermines the suggestion that the hostile motive requirement in suspect 
class-equal protection analysis supports a like requirement as a component of 
a successful passive enforcement defense. When a federal prosecutorial policy 
is challenged as an infringement of the right to speech or petition, clearly the 
first amendment applies directly. Accordingly, the practice will fall unless, at 
a minimum, the government can demonstrate that a compelling state interest 
supports its cont in~at ion .~~ The defendant need not show a governmental 
motive hostile to the right to trigger this elevated standard of review.81 If the 
focus is on equal protection and the claim is that the classification burdens 
fundamental constitutional rights such as those guaranteed by the first amend- 
ment, the classification is subjected to a virtually identical compelling state 
interest test.82 It makes no sense to trigger a heightened level of equal protec- 
tion scrutiny only upon a showing of hostile governmental motive when a 
direct application of the first amendment would automatically benefit from 
elevated review.83 To require a hostile motive in this context would celebrate 
the form of equal protection methodology over the function of protecting first 
amendment rights, with the irrational consequence of allowing the choice of 
the mode of inquiry to dilute the protections of the first amendment. 
In sum, equal protection analysis of first amendment interests does not 
support the motive requirement. No court taking an equal protection ap- 
proach to first amendment interests, except those considering passive enforce- 
ment, has yet found legislative motive to be any more relevant than under 
direct first amendment analysis. Nevertheless, the motive requirement may be 
defended as a necessary element of judicial review of a discretionary executive 
decision. This justification for a required showing of hostile motive-rooted 
not in inferences drawn from suspect class-equal protection precedent, but 
rather in the procedural posture in which selective enforcement claims inevita- 
bly arise-merits examination. 
B .  Judicial Review of Executive Discretion 
Even if the motive requirement enunciated in the selective enforcement 
cases is not justified as an element of the equal protection framework the 
courts have applied in such cases, it may be justified as a mechanism for 
assuring judicial deference to the exercise of executive discretion. The selective 
80. See, e.g., Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620,639 (1980) 
(holding that a no-solicitation ordinance was "insufficiently related to the governmental interests 
asserted in its support to justify its interference with protected speech"). 
81. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text. 
82. Compare Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 636-39 
(1980) (first amendment), with Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (equal protection). In 
Mosley, the Supreme Court assessed interwoven first amendment and equal protection claims 
together under heightened scrutiny. 
83. Cf. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 103 S. Ct. 948, 959 (1983) (An 
argument rejected under first amendment analysis "fares no better in equal protection garb."). 
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enforcement cases and their predecessors dating back to Yick Wo have all 
involved judicial review of executive action under a facially neutral statute. 
Historically, the courts have shown deference to the exercise of executive 
discretion, and an advocate of the motive requirement might argue that the 
motive determination reflects such deference and, accordingly, is an appropri- 
ate threshold for judicial review. 
For two reasons, however, this argument does not apply if the executive 
decisions rest on a generally applicable policy. First, if the executive acts under 
a policy there is no discretion, and therefore the traditional justifications for 
deference are inapplicable. Second, executive policies should be analyzed 
under the same standards as statutes, which are reviewed under the first 
amendment without regard to motive. These reasons presuppose the judicial 
capacity to discover the existence and nature of the policy. Discovering re- 
viewable policy poses no great problem, however. The executive policy may be 
stated explicitly, as was the passive enforcement policy, or it may be inferred, 
from the disparate impact of the executive action. 
1. The Motive Requirement as a Mechanism for Assuring Judicial Defer- 
ence to the Exercise ofExecutive Discretion. - The general reluctance of the 
judiciary to review an exercise of prosecutorial discretion may support an 
argument for the relevance of motive to the selective prosecution defense. 
Courts occasionally state as an absolute proposition that they may never 
consider a challenge to a prosecutor's decision whether to prosecute.E4 Such 
courts often read the constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers to 
support their deferential approach. Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger's state- 
ment in Newman v. United State.P5 is typical of this view: 
Few subjects are less adapted to judicial review than the exercise by 
the Executive of his discretion in deciding when and whether to 
institute criminal proceedings . . . . [Wlhile this discretion is subject 
to misuse or abuse just as is judicial discretion, deviations from his 
duty as an agent of the Executive are to be dealt with by his superi- 
o r ~ . ~ ~  
Courts also have defended their refusal to review the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion on such practical grounds as an unwillingness to disturb the benefi- 
84. See, e.g., Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480, 482 (D.C. Cir. 1967); United 
States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965). See generally Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding 
the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1 (1971); Cox, Prosecutorial 
Discretion: An Overview, 13 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 383 (1976); LaFave, The Prosecutor's Discretion 
in the United States, 18 Am. J. Comp. L. 532 (1970); Note, Reviewability of Prosecutorial 
Discretion: Failure to Prosecute, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 130 (1975). The nonreviewability of prosecu- 
torial choices has been called the "majority rule." E.g., Cox, supra, at 394. 
85. 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
86. Id. at 480,482; accord, e.g., Goldberg v. Hoffman, 225 F.2d 463,465-66 (7th Cir. 1955) 
("Discretion is always subject to abuse, but the framers of our Constitution have indicated their 
conviction that the danger of abuse by the executive is a lesser evil than to render the acts left to 
executive control subject to judicial encroachment."). But cf. Newman, 382 F.2d at 482 (Bazelon, 
J., concurring opinion) (advocating review of irrational or otherwise unconstitutional decisions). 
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cia1 individualization of justi~e,~' protection of the accused,88 protection of 
the criminal process from burdensome delay,89 and the need for secrecy of 
prosecutorial policy to maintain de te r ren~e .~~  
Not all courts, however, have refused absolutely to review prosecutorial 
di~cretion,~' and it is in this context that the motive requirement has devel- 
oped, as a middle ground between total deference and ordinary judicial review 
of administrative decisions. Courts are more receptive to some inquiry into 
prosecutorial decisionmaking where the defendant asserts a defect in the 
decision to prosecute as part of his own defenseg2 rather than as the basis for 
mandamus or injunction against the person of the p r o s e c ~ t o r . ~ ~  The standard 
for review of a selective prosecution defense grew out of the line of cases 
suggesting that some limited review of prosecutorial discretion was appropri- 
ate. Courts in such cases, though not entirely unwilling to review prosecutorial 
decisionmaking, required a showing of hostile motive as a threshold to re- 
view.94 The argument for the motive requirement in selective prosecution cases 
thus conceives of motive as a screening mechanism that permits courts to 
remain highly deferential to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion while still 
permitting review in a circumscribed body of cases. Under this view, motive 
demonstrates the "rare situation where the decision to prosecute is so abusive 
. . . as to encroach on constitutionally protected rights."g5 Motive thus be- 
87. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Hoffman, 225 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1955) (refusal of prosecutor to 
withdraw suit despite finding that criminal prosecution would endanger defendant's life is beyond 
review of the court); Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (myriad factors in 
discretion renders it unreviewable); Cox, supra note 84, at  390-91; LaFave, supra note 84, at 534. 
88. See Note, supra note 84, at 141-42. 
89. See Abrams, supra note 84, at 52-53. 
90. See id. at 26; Note, supra note 84, at 141. 
91. The cases taking the absolute position that no review of prosecutorial discretion is 
warranted also fly in the face of "a hundred Supreme Court decisions stating that it is the 
function of the judiciary to review the exercise of executive discretion." K. Davis, Discretionary 
Justice 210 (1969) (criticizing Ne~vman v. United States). 
92. See, e.g., Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962); United States v. Johnson, 577 F.2d 1304 
(5th Cir. 1978); Dixon v. District of Columbia, 394 F.2d 966 (D.C. Cir. 1968); cf. Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (review of administrative discretion in context of criminal prosecu- 
tion; unlimited discretion constitutionally suspect). But cf. Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 
479 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (rejecting review of prosecutorial discretion asserted on equal protection 
grounds by defendant). 
93. See, e-g., United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1965) (contempt citation for 
failure to obey injunction to sign indictment); Goldberg v. Hoffman, 225 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1955) 
(mandamus to enjoin criminal proceedings); cf. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (refusal to 
enjoin enforcement of criminal syndicalism statute based on first amendment chilling effect). 
That courts often do review prosecutorial decisions undercuts the separation of powers argument, 
see supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text, as a bar to review. 
94. See, e.g., Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); 
United States v. Johnson, 577 F.2d 1304 (5th Cir. 1978); Dixon v. District of Columbia, 394 F.2d 
966 (D.C. Cir. 1968). See generally, Cox, supra note 84; Cardinale & Feldman, supra note 9; 
Note, supra note 9. 
95. United States v. Johnson, 577 F.2d 1304, 1307 (5th Cir. 1978). 
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comes a justification for a limited exception to the general proposition that 
prosecutorial discretion ought not to be subject to judicial evaluation. 
2. The Inapplicability of a Motive Threshold Requirement to Review of 
Prosecutorial Policy. - The suggestion that appropriate judicial reluctance to 
review prosecutorial decisions justifies requiring a showing of hostile motive 
fails when a broad policy of passive enforcement infringes on first amendment 
rights. Two arguments demonstrate the inapplicability of a threshold motive 
requirement to judicial review of prosecutorial policy in this context. First, an 
enforcement policy is not an exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the normal 
sense of an individual decision to prosecute. Second, any implicit discretion- 
ary grant to the Executive by Congress must be subject to the same constitu- 
tional limitations that apply to Congress. 
The first argument for not requiring a showing of motive when a defend- 
ant challenges the practice of passive enforcement rests on the observation 
that an enforcement policy is not an exercise of discretion at all. Therefore, 
the various practical justifications advanced in support of nonreviewability of 
prosecutorial discretiong6 have no relevance. The goal of promoting individu- 
alized, nonstandardized justice is inoperative if the decisionmaking process 
being challenged is a standardized one. 
A decision by the Selective Service to refer for prosecution only those 
nonregistrants who write a letter of protest is not an exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion but the application of such a general policy. Accordingly none of 
the justifications for nonreviewability-which in turn might be advanced to 
support a motive requirementg7-are germane. The Selective Service does not 
examine the evidence and mitigating circumstances in each individual case.O6 
When the constitutional implications of such a policy are raised in defense to a 
criminal prosecution, the separation-of-powers problems raised by granting 
mandamus and injunctive relief against members of the executive branch are 
not present. The goal of protecting the accused is not implicated where no 
individual determination is challenged. While the deterrence rationale re- 
mains, the government interest in deterrence is no less amenable to judicial 
review than other governmental interests invoked by agency action. Thus, a 
selective enforcement policy, where discoverable, ought to be no less review- 
able than any other agency rule, without regard to the motivation for the 
policy. Such review of prosecutorial policy-as distinct from discretion-has 
both judicialg9 and scholarly100 support. 
96. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text. 
97. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text. 
98. Cf. Ostereich v. Selective Service System Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233, 238 (1968) 
(Draft board reclassification policy is without statutory grant of discretion; "there is no exercise 
of discretion by a Board in evaluating evidence and in determining whether a claimed exemption is 
deserved."). 
99. See Nader v. Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676, 679 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Wright, J.) (dictum). But cf. 
Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("[EJven the 
boldest advocates of judicial review recognize that the agencies' internal management decisions 
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A second argument militates against reading traditional judicial deference 
to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to support a motive requirement in 
passive enforcement cases. Prosecutorial discretion represents an implicit con- 
gressional grant of discretion to the executive branch to choose the cases in 
which the law will be enforced.lol Yet even where the legislative grant of 
discretion is both explicit and broad, the grant itself is still subject to constitu- 
tional limitations. For example, despite the body of precedent reading a 
federal statute to have created broad discretion in the Secretary of State to 
deny passports,lo2 the Supreme Court refused to construe the statute to permit 
the State Department to revoke a passport solely because its holder was a 
supporter of the Communist Party.lo3 The Court was unwilling to construe the 
statute to permit revocation on this ground because such an administrative 
policy implicates "beliefs, . . . associations . . . [and] ideological matters."lo4 
While explicitly declining to reach the question whether such a policy would be 
constitutional, this language evidences the Court's reluctance to read even a 
broad grant of discretion to allow consideration of constitutionally suspect 
factors. 
Simply stated, Congress cannot grant discretion to do what it cannot 
itself do by statute. A prosecutorial policy can be valid only if such a policy 
could validly be embodied in a statute.lo5 Motive is no more relevant to a first 
amendment analysis of an administrative policy of passive enforcement than it 
would be to a first amendment analysis of a passive enforcement statute. 
In sum, the suggestion that traditional judicial deference to prosecutorial 
discretion justifies requiring a showing of hostile motive as part of a passive 
enforcement defense fails on two counts. First, it fails to recognize that when 
a decision to prosecute rests on a general policy and not on individualized 
considerations, the justifications for judicial deference have little relevance. 
and allocations of priorities are not a proper subject of inquiry by the courts.") (dictum). The 
"allocations of priorities" referred to in Medical Committee are priorities between substantive 
areas of enforcement, though, and not of prosecution between violators of the same statute. 
100. See Cox, supra note 84, at  402-03; Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice (Book Re- 
view), 81 Yale L.J. 575, 593-95 (1972); Note, supra note 84, at 160; see also Abrams, supra note 
84, at 52 (allowing review of prosecutorial policy by third parties but not by criminal defendant); 
LaFave, supra note 84, at 539 ("As for judicial review, it is probably true that courts have 
exercised undue restraint in responding to challenges of prosecutorial discretion."). 
101. See Abrams, supra note 84, at  20. For a rare example of congressional influence on the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion, see Pub. L. No. 96-74, $8 614, 615, 93 Stat. 559, 562 (1979) 
(appropriations bill denies I.R.S. authority to use funds to enforce rulings on tax exempt status of 
segregated schools). 
102. E.g., Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 349-50 (1939). 
103. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 130 (1958). 
104. Id. at 130; see also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (FCC 
regulatory grant limited by first amendment). 
105. Cf. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 11 (1944) (upholding an administrative policy that 
would be valid as a statute). Indeed, a statute granting completely unfettered discretion in its 
application may be invalid. See Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 
U.S. 356 (1886). The all but dormant nondelegation doctrine is at odds with an implicit boundless 
grant of prosecutorial discretion. See Wright, supra note 100, at  582-87. 
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Second, the argument fails to recognize that motive should be no more 
germane to first amendment analysis of an administrative policy than to first 
amendment analysis of the same policy embodied explicitly in a statute.loO 
Both arguments make clear that an inquiry into motive in passive enforcement 
cases is inappropriate when the prosecutorial policy is known. In such cases 
conventional first amendment analysis107 applies, and motive plays no role in 
evaluating the constitutionality of the practice.lo8 In many instances, however, 
it is not an easy task to discern whether a broad policy underlay a decision to 
prosecute and, if so, what the precise content of that policy was. The discus- 
sion that follows offers a methodology for discovering prosecutorial policy 
and suggests that motive may indeed be relevant to that inquiry. 
3. Discovering Reviewable Policy. - Judicial review of prosecutorial 
policy depends on the court's ability to recognize the existence and content of 
the challenged policy. The appropriate approach for determining this policy in 
turn depends on the context in which the claim arises. In the case of an 
isolated government action, the motivation for the action may be the only 
evidence that a policy affecting constitutional interests exists. Such a motive is 
not necessary to establish the existence of a policy where, as in passive 
enforcement, the government has publicly announced its broadly applicable 
policy. Further, even where enforcement policy is kept secret, sufficient evi- 
dence of disproportionate impact may serve to establish a judicially review- 
able enforcement policy. 
a. Motive as the Policy of an Isolated Action. - When a single prosecu- 
tion, rather than a pattern of prosecutions, is challenged as an abridgment of 
first amendment rights, the policy behind the government's action is its mo- 
tive. The Supreme Court's decision in Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. 
DoylelOg suggests this identity. In Mt. Healthy, the Supreme Court reviewed a 
teacher's challenge to the school board's failure to grant him tenure. The 
teacher established at trial that his protected speech activity was a substantial 
106. A third argument militates against reading traditional judicial deference to the exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion to support a motive requirement in passive enforcement cases. The 
argument relies on an analogy between motive as a threshold mechanism for deference to 
prosecutorial discretion and the substantive standard of review of administrative action, which 
also may be viewed as a vehicle for showing deference to the exercise of executive discretion. 
Normally, courts review administrative action under a deferential, rational basis standard, see 
NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944); Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative 
State, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 28-34 (1983), and review selective prosecution only if there is a 
showing of hostile motive-another means of showing deference. See supra text accompanying 
notes 84-95. In the face of a first amendment challenge to  executive action, however, deference in 
the form of rational basis review is not appropriate-courts apply strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Haig 
v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) (passport revocation); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) (denial of 
permission to travel). By analogy, deference in the form of a hostile motive requirement should 
not be required for first amendment selective prosecution claims. 
107. For a discussion of the appropriate first amendment analysis in passive enforcement 
cases, see infra notes 123-77 and accompanying text. 
108. See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text. 
109. 429 U.S. 274 (1977). 
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motivating factor in the board's decision not to grant tenure, even though the 
board had other reasons to dismiss him that were unrelated to speech. The 
district court awarded damages, and the court of appeals affirmed. The 
Supreme Court remanded the case for a determination whether the Board 
could demonstrate that the dismissal would have occurred whether or not it 
had considered the protected activities. Only if the dismissal would not have 
occurred but for the teacher's speech would the first amendment provide 
protection. Mt. Healthy thus states a causation requirement for first amend- 
ment challenges to isolated administrative actions. The Court saw this require- 
ment as necessary to avoid placing an employee "in a better position as a 
result of the exercise of constitutionally protected conduct than he would have 
occupied had he done nothing.""O 
The Mt. Healthy causation rule translates into a motive test for individual 
administrative actions."' The first amendment claimant bears the initial bur- 
den of establishing constitutionally protected conduct as a " 'motivating fac- 
tor' "112 for the government action. Such a requirement makes sense in the 
case of individual action. Simply to show that the claimant has exercised a 
constitutional right and then been dismissed (or prosecuted) does not demon- 
strate that his constitutional rights have been violated. Proof of such violation 
turns on evidence of some causal link between the exercise and the action. In 
the case of an isolated action, motive establishes this link. 
The motive-causation test goes a long way towards explaining-and justi- 
fying-the judicial inclination to require a showing of a motive hostile to a 
protected right when confronted with selective prosecution claims. The prose- 
cutorial discretion modelu3 posits individual, case-by-case decisionmaking. 
When the claim arises in the context of an isolated prosecution, the policy, if 
any, that underlay the decision to prosecute is discoverable only by inquiring 
into the motive for the prosecution. On the other hand, where a pattkrn of 
prosecutions suggests the possible existence of a broadly applied, deliberate 
policy, or where the policy is embodied in an official statement, motive is no 
longer relevant to discovering that policy. 
b. Official Statements of Policy. - When the government has issued an 
official statement of the determinants of its decision to enforce a statute in a 
given case, resort to an inquiry into motive to discover the existence or content 
of prosecutorial policy is not necessary. This conclusion is consistent with the 
analysis outlined in Mt. Healthy-first amendment protections are triggered 
only when there is a causal link between the exercise of constitutional rights 
and the challenged governmental action. But in the rare instance where the 
government has explicitly divulged its enforcement policy, the need to demon- 
strate a motive hostile to a protected right as evidence of this causal link 
110. Id. at 285. 
1 1  1. See City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975) (individual municipal act of 
annexation subject to scrutiny for improper motive). 
112. Mt. Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). 
113. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text. 
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completely disappears. For example, under the "passive enforcement" policy 
used by the Selective Service System, the only nonregistrants referred to the 
Justice Department for prosecution were those who turned themselves in or 
were turned in by third parties. Such a policy does not necessarily entail a 
hostility to the exercise of first amendment rights.u4 Prosecution is directed, 
however, only at nonregistrants who have exercised first amendment rights, 
either by writing letters of protest to the government indicating refusal to 
comply or by publicly stating their noncompliance with registration and being 
subsequently turned in by third parties. The exercise of first amendment rights 
provides the but-for cause of prosecution, and the existence and content of the 
prosecutorial policy is clear irrespective of the motive behind the practice. 
The rarity of official policy statements poses an obstacle to their use as a 
source of reviewable policy. While commentators have urged that prosecuto- 
rial policies be articulated and made public,H5 official policy statements such 
- as the Selective Service passive enforcement system and the IRS preference for 
prosecuting visible tax protestors are relatively rare.He If the defense of un- 
constitutional prosecutorial policy were available only when based on official 
policy statements, such statements would become even less common. 
c. Disproportionate Effects as Evidence of Policy. - An official state- 
ment, however, is not the only way to discover a prosecutorial policy; nor 
should it be the only way to subject such a policy to review. A reviewable 
policy can be established, at least presumptively, by demonstrating a dispro- 
portionate pattern of prosecutorial choice. Cases applying equal protection 
analysis suggest such a use of disproportionate effects. At one extreme are 
cases in which the racial impact is so starkly disproportionate that invidious 
purpose can be inferred from the impact alone.u7 For example, the Yick Wo 
Court needed no official statement of policy to invalidate a statute applied 
exclusively to the disadvantage of Chinese.l18 Where the disproportionate 
effect is less startling, the Court has used it as the starting point for equal 
protection analysis. The challenged classification will merit a heightened level 
114. Cf. United States v. Catlett, 584 F.2d 864, 866-67 & n.5 (8th Cir. 1978) (IRS policy of 
emphasizing prosecution of visible tax protestors upheld; policy includes disclaimer of the " 'in- 
tention [or] desire to suppress dissent or to persecute individuals because they are critical of . . . 
the tax system or government policies.' "). 
115. K. Davis, supra note 91, at  225; Abrams, supra note 84, at 25-34; Wright, supra note 
100, at  590. 
116. Other aspects of IRS enforcement policy, such as audit selection criteria, are carefully 
guarded secrets. See Cox, supra note 84, at 141. 
117. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 
(1886); see also Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 
260 (1977) (dictum). Were Gomillion and Yick Wo to arise today, even under the regime of 
Washington v. Davis, there can be little doubt that the extent of the disproportionate impact 
would serve to prove the impermissible intent. 
118. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886). 
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of review only upon proof that its purpose was to burden a suspect class, but 
disproportionate impact may help to prove that purp~se."~ 
While disproportionate effect is the starting point in an equal protection 
analysis, it is closer to the finishing point in a first amendment analysis that 
does not consider motive. In such an analysis the objective is not to discover 
impermissible motive but rather the existence and content of a policy which 
may then be reviewed for its effect on protected rights. Since a disproportion- 
ate effect on the exercise of first amendment rights implies a prosecutorial 
policy with a chilling effect, a showing of disproportionate effect ought to 
shift to the government the burden of proving that no such policy underlay the 
prosec~tion. '~~ 
The question of what degree of proportionality the defendant must show 
before the burden will shift is problematic. The required showing of dispro- 
portionality ought not to be set too low since any enforcement policy is likely 
to lead to the discovery and prosecution of a greater proportion of those who 
talk about their crime than of those who remain silent. Nevertheless, a show- 
ing that, of 500,000 suspected violators, all thirteen prosecuted were vocal 
protestors121 ought to suffice to shift to the government the burden of denying 
the existence of an impermissible prosecutorial policy. Setting a high threshold 
requirement helps to mitigate the court-clogging effects of the selective prose- 
cution defense since it reduces the number of defendants able to make such a 
~ 1 a i m . l ~ ~  By limiting judicial inquiry to those situations in which the effects of 
prosecutorial policy are public knowledge, a high threshold also protects the 
legitimate government interest in keeping prosecutorial policies secret. Allow- 
ing the review of policy evidenced by disproportionate effect also reduces the 
inhibition of public statements of policy, since policy can be reviewed whether 
or not it is made public. 
A shift in the burden of explaining a policy may not always be fatal to the 
government's case. While unlikely in the case of starkly disproportionate 
effect, the government might show the effect to be the purely fortuitous result 
of a policy that would not normally favor prosecution of vocal offenders. If 
the government does have a policy that favors prosecution of vocal offenders 
119. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 
(1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). 
120. Such a shift in burden is consistent with selective prosecution cases that infer the motive 
necessary to establish a prima facie claim of selective prosecution from the disproportionate 
number of vocal offenders prosecuted. See, e.g., United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th 
Cir. 1972); United States v. Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074, 1078 (4th Cir. 1972); United States v. 
Wayte, 549 F. Supp. 1376, 1385 (C.D. Cal. 1982), rev'd, 710 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983); cf. Mt. 
Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (burden of proof of causation shifted 
once claimant establishes exercise of first amendment rights as " 'motivating factor' " behind 
dismissal). 
121. See United States v. Wayte, 549 F. Supp. 1376, 1379 & n.3 (C.D. Cal. 1982), rev'd, 710 
F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983). 
122. Setting a high threshold for a disproportionate-effect showing is also consistent with 
first amendment analysis. See infra text accompanying notes 163-70. 
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it can attempt to justify the disparate impact of its policy. Yet justifications 
such as cost savings, deterrent value, and evidentiary value must be subject to 
scrutiny under the first amendment. If such justifications would not validate a 
statute embodying the selective enforcement policy, they will not support the 
prosecutorial policy itself. 
Thus, neither the equal protection framework within which selective 
prosecution analysis developed, nor the judicial review of executive discretion 
posture of the selective prosecution defense requires such a showing of motive 
where a broad policy affects first amendment interests. Further, such a policy 
usually can be discovered without reference to motive. Once discovered, the 
policy must be subject to direct first amendment review. It remains to be seen 
whether a passive enforcement policy survives such scrutiny. 
Passive enforcement can be analyzed either as a content-based regulation 
of speech or as a general regulatory measure that incidentally burdens speech. 
The standard of review under the first amendment turns on this determina- 
tion. The starkly disproportionate effect that passive enforcement has on 
vocal violators suggests that it merits review as a content-based regulation. As 
such, passive enforcement fails first amendment review since protest against 
draft registration is clearly within the first amendment's protection. If a court 
treats passive enforcement as a content-neutral regulatory measure, the gov- 
ernment interests offered to justify the policy must be weighed against the 
burden imposed on speech interests. Consideration of these interests and the 
alternate means available for achieving them demonstrates the constitutional 
invalidity of passive enforcement. 
A. Passive Enforcement as a Content-Based Distinction 
Cases123 and c ~ m m e n t a r y ' ~ ~  suggest a distinct mode of first amendment 
analysis where government action affecting the speaker is based on the politi- 
cal content of his speech. Such a content-based distinction violates the first 
amendment unless the speech singled out is outside that amendment's protect- 
ive ambit.lZ5 
A passive enforcement policy that prosecutes only persons who report 
themselves to the government looks like a content-based distinction. Prosecu- 
tion depends on expression, and only expression with a particular content-"I 
refuse to complyy'-draws prosecution. This characterization is muddied 
somewhat by the prosecution of persons who are reported by third parties, 
123. See, e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972). 
124. See G. Gunther, Cases and Materials on Constitutional Law 1 1  18-95 (10th ed. 1980); L. 
Tribe, supra note 41, at 580-84. 
125. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,448 (1969); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 
36, 50 (1961). 
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since conceivably prosecution in these cases may not rest on speech at 
But, in the context of nonregistration for the draft, a third-party informant is 
almost invariably aware of the nonregistrant's violation only if he has spoken 
about it. Thus, even where the violation is reported by a third party, a passive 
enforcement policy has the nearly inevitable effect of selecting only those who 
express their refusal to comply. The Supreme Court has treated as content- 
based distinctions statutes that, though facially neutral, had an inevitable 
effect that was constitutionally ~ r0h ib i t ed . l~~  Thus, the possibility of third 
party reporting does not refute the argument that a passive enforcement policy 
ought to be considered a content-based distinction. 
A passive enforcement policy analyzed as a content-based distinction 
violates the first amendment if the speech concerned is protected. That the 
speech takes the form of a letter of protest to the government does not remove 
it from first amendment protection; the Supreme Court has held that private 
communications are protected speech.12* In addition, a letter of protest to the 
government might very well be characterized as a protected "petition . . . for 
126. See infra note 135. Despite this possibility, one circuit has analyzed passive enforcement 
as a content-based measure. United States v. Schmucker, No. 82-3701, slip op. at  5-7 (6th Cir. 
Nov. 25. 1983) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Cir file). 
127. This approach is implicit in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936). The 
Court invalidated a statute that imposed a tax on the advertising revenues of newspapers with a 
weekly circulation of over 20,000. The Court did not deny the state's power to subject newspapers 
to taxation, id. at  250, but found the form of the tax unconstitutional in two ways: "First, its 
effect is to curtail the amount of revenue realized from advertising, and, second, its direct 
tendency is to restrict circulation." Id. at 244-45. 
Grosjean also contains language that suggests that the statute's unconstitutionality was due 
to a hostile legislative motive inferred from the form of the statute. Id. at 250 ("deliberate and 
calculated device"). This hostile motive aspect of Grosjean was recently reaffirmed in a strikingly 
similar case, Minneapolis Star &Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 103 S. Ct. 1365, 
1369 (1983) (dictum), discussed supra notes 48-49. Minneapolis Star explictly disclaims that proof 
of motive is necessary to trigger these protections. Id. at  1376. 
The facts of Minneapolis Star closely parallel those of Grosjean. Unlike the Grosjean court, 
however, the Minneapolis Star Court treated the statute not as a content-based distinction 
meriting automatic invalidation under the first amendment, but rather as a neutral regulatory 
measure that incidentally burdened speech. Accordingly, the Court applied a balancing approach. 
See infra notes 136-52 and accompanying text. A superficial comparison of Grosjean and 
Minneapolis Star might, therefore, imply that a facially neutral statute that has the inevitable 
effect of punishing content no longer will warrant treatment as a content-based distinction. This 
implication is unwarranted as the cases are distinguishable. The newspapers burdened by the 
statute in Minneapolis Star shared no common editorial view; the statute did not distinguish 
between newspapers on the basis of content. In Grosjean, on the other hand, the statute affected 
almost exclusively newspapers that had been critical of the legislature, and this "content-based 
disparate impact" influenced the court to apply the strictest first amendment scrutiny. See 
Minneapolis Star. 103 S. Ct. at  1369. Thus, the "inevitable disparate effect" test still retains its 
validity in first amendment analysis. 
The Supreme Court has relied on inevitable disparate effects to invalidate facially valid 
statutes in other constitutional contexts. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (inevita- 
ble starkly disproportionate racial impact); McFarland v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 241 U.S. 79 
(1916) (neutral statute inevitably applicable to only one firm). 
128. Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414 (1979). 
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redress of grievances."12Q Nor should the self-incriminatory nature of the 
expression remove it from first amendment protection.130 
A public statement of refusal to comply is unprotected only if it can be 
characterized as illegal a d ~ 0 c a c y . l ~ ~  However, such a statement does not fall 
within the current Brandenburg v. Ohio132 two-part test of unprotected advo- 
cacy, which requires that "such advocacy [be] directed to inciting or produc- 
ing imminent lawless action and [be] likely to incite or produce such 
action."133 Passive enforcement makes no attempt to ferret out speech "di- 
rected to" producing future nonregistration. Further, given the nature of the 
violation, the threat of nonregistration cannot be characterized as "imminent 
lawless action."134 If analyzed as a content-based distinction, then, passive 
enforcement of the draft registration law is prohibited by the first amend- 
ment. 
B. Passive Enforcement as an Indirect Restriction of Speech 
Despite its startlingly disproportionate effect, a passive enforcement pol- 
icy might nevertheless be analyzed as an indirect restriction of speech. A court 
might decline to treat passive enforcement as a content-based distinction if it 
were to find that the enforcement policy, while having a disproportionate 
impact on draft protestors, did not inevitably select only vocal violators.13G 
129. U.S. Const. amend. I, cl. 6; cf. Dixon v. District of Columbia, 394 F.2d 966, 968 (D.C. 
Cir. 1968) (Bazelon, C.J.) (treating harrassment claim as protected petition). 
130. See infra notes 158-62 and accompanying text; cf. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 
391,401 (1976) (protection of noncompelled self-incrimination may stem from first amendment). 
Nor may self-incriminating statements be characterized as speech that is itself a crime. United 
States v. Schmucker, No. 82-3701, slip op. at 6-7 (6th Cir. Nov. 25, 1983) (available on LEXIS, 
Genfed library Cir file); cf. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice CO., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949) 
(coercive picketing of employer is speech unprotected as criminal in itself). 
131. The nonprotection of illegal advocacy is based on the "clear and present danger" test of 
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). But see Leader, Free Speech and the Advocacy of 
Illegal Action in Law and Political Theory, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 412 (1982) (suggesting that 
advocacy of illegal action should be protected in most cases). 
132. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
133. Id. at  447. 
134. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (Statement that "[wJe'll take the fucking 
street again" during dispersal of street demonstration is not unprotected illegal advocacy; "at 
worst, it amounted to nothing more than advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future 
time."). Similarly, the illegal inaction of nonregistrants can only take place at some indefinite 
future time. For a hint that the Court may be broadening the unprotected area of speech 
presenting a "clear and present danger," see Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) ("serious 
damage" to national security likely to result from exposure of CIA agents renders speech 
unprotected). The content-based analysis may in fact collapse into the balancing approach 
discussed infra text accompanying notes 136-52. As the analysis in Agee suggests, the "clear and 
present danger" test may simply be a balancing test in which the extreme chilling effect of a 
content-based distinction requires the justification of an unusually strong government interest to 
overcome it. 
135. The selection of a nonvocal violator by passive enforcement is plausible, if unlikely. A 
public-spirited parent might know of her son's failure to register and turn him in without his 
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Viewed in this light, passive enforcement is nothing more than a neutral 
practice that only incidentally affects speech. 
A regulation that burdens speech interests but does not explicitly regulate 
speech calls for a different analysis than that applied to direct regulation of 
speech. The Court has generally shown greater sensitivity to state interests in 
such cases.13e These situations include overbroad statutes,13' the chilling ef- 
fects of the uncertain application of legal rules,13s access to public f ~ r a , ' ~ ~  and 
other rules of general applicability that create a disproportionate burden on 
certain exercises of speech.140 
The appropriate judicial approach to such regulations is unclear.141 The 
cases may be read to require a balancing approach under which the govern- 
ment's interests are weighed against the burden on speech.142 An alternative 
reading suggests a more categorical approach: once a regulation is found to 
burden speech it will be considered valid only if it constitutes the least restric- 
tive means of serving a compelling state interest.143 The difference between 
these approaches may be overstated. A good deal of implicit balancing of 
interests goes on before a court finds a "compelling state interest" or a 
"burden" on speech.144 
having exercised speech rights. Cf. United States v. Eklund, 551 F. Supp. 964, 967 (S.D. Iowa 
1982) (names of violators submitted by parents). 
136. The Court has applied a test that demands a "compelling state interest" to validate such 
a regulation. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 680 (1972). While the compelling state 
interest test is strict, it is not as stringent as the "clear and present danger" test applied to content- 
based regulation of speech. Compare Branzburg (state interest in securing grand jury testimony 
"compelling") with Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (clear and present danger test 
requires direct advocacy of imminent lawless action). 
137. See, e.g., Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980); 
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). See generally G. Gunther, supra note 124, at  1185- 
95. 
138. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (forcing speaker to be 
guarantor of truth promotes self-censorship antithetical to first amendment); Schauer, Fear, Risk, 
and The First Amendment: Unravelling the "Chilling Effect," 58 B.U.L. Rev. 685 (1978). 
139. See, e.g., Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980); 
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). 
140. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (assessing the burden of compelled grand 
jury testimony on freedom of the press); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 
(1958) (finding that required disclosure of membership lists disproportionately burdens unpopular 
groups). 
141. See G. Gunther, supra note 124, at  1113-17. See generally Ely, Flag Desecration: A 
Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1482 (1975). 
142. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36,49-51 (1961); L. Tribe, supra note 41, at  580- 
84; Ely, supra note 141. But see United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258,268 n.20 (1967) ("inappro- 
priate for this Court to label one [interest] as being more important or more substantial than the 
other"); Konigsberg, 366 U.S. at  56-80 (Black, J., dissenting). 
143. E.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980). 
144. See G. Gunther, supra note 124, at  1116-17; Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the 
First Amendment, 72 Yale L.J. 877,914-15 (1963); cf. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280,308-09 (1981) 
(not explicitly balancing interests; but where national security is threatened, revocation of pass- 
port for public statements found not to inhibit speech). 
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A classic statement of the balancing approach appeared in Justice 
Harlan's opinion in Konigsberg v. State Bar:145 
[Gleneral regulatory statutes, not intended to control the content of 
speech but incidentally limiting its unfettered exercise, have not been 
regarded as the type of law the First or Fourteenth Amendment 
forbade Congress or the States to pass, when they have been found 
justified by subordinating valid governmental interests, a prerequi- 
site to constitutionality which has necessarily involved a weighing of 
the governmental interest involved.148 
The Court's most recent decision considering an indirect burden on speech 
explicitly adopts this balancing approach. In Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. 
v. Minnesota Commissioner of R e ~ e n u e , ' ~ ~  the Supreme Court sustained a 
challenge to a state use tax on large purchasers of paper and ink products. The 
statute did not on its face restrict speech, nor did the Court find a legislative 
intent to restrict speech.'48 Nevertheless, the effect of the statute was to derive 
two-thirds of the revenues raised from one particular newspaper. While con- 
ceding that the revenue-raising goal was legitimate,140 the Court found it to be 
outweighed by the burden it imposed on expression. The Court's adoption of 
a balancing approach was explicit: "The appropriate method of analysis thus 
is to balance the burden implicit in singling out the press against the interest 
asserted by the State."lS0 
Like the Minneapolis Star newsprint tax, passive enforcement has valid 
objectives-deterrence and cost savings,151 for example-yet it also has a 
grossly disproportionate burden on those who exercise first amendment rights. 
Thus, unless the reviewing court considers the impact of passive enforcement 
on speech to be so inevitable as to warrant treatment as a content-based 
distinction, it will apply the balancing-of-interests approach. Under this ap- 
proach, the weight of the government's interest is diminished if some other 
means less restrictive of speech might accomplish the same end.'" Consider- 
ation of both the weight of the speech interests asserted in the draft nonregis- 
tration context and the less restrictive alternatives to passive enforcement that 
are available demonstrate the unconstitutionality of such a policy. 
1. The Speech Interests. - The weight to be given the speech interests 
infringed by the government regulation has two components. First, the Court 
has suggested the existence of a discernable hierarchy of speech categories 
145. 366 U.S. 36 (1961). 
146. Id. at 50-51 (citations omitted); accord L. Tribe, supra note 41, at 580-84. 
147. 103 S. Ct. 1365 (1983). 
148. Id. at 1376. 
149. Id. at 1372. 
150. Id. at 1372 n.7. 
151. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text. 
152. See, e.g.. MinneapolisSfar, 103 S. Ct. at 1372; Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 
366 U.S. 293 (1961); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). See generally, L. Tribe, supra note 
41, at 582-88. 
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within which political speech is favored. Second, the weight of the speech 
depends on the degree to which the expression is chilled and the availability of 
alternative unrestricted forums. 
a. Conscientious Noncompliance as Highly Valued Political Speech. - 
The Supreme Court has made clear that it views speech that advances political 
debate of primary importance in the hierarchy of first amendment values.lS3 It 
has relied on the "profound national commitment to the principle that debate 
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open" in striking 
down state libel laws that allowed liability for defamation of public officials 
without a showing of "actual malice,"154 and has referred to political speech 
as "more than self expression; [but rather] the essence of self-government."155 
These cases suggest that political speech warrants more protection than speech 
that serves individual expression and deve10pment.l~~ This preference may be 
rooted in the perception that self expression is an individual right, while 
political expression embodies both the individual's right to express his opinion 
and society's right-and need-to hear that expression.lS7 
The communication of one's refusal to comply with a law fits within the 
framework of preferred political expression. Civil disobedience is an impor- 
tant part of the lawmaking and self-government process.lS8 Professor Leader 
suggests that civil disobedience has an educative function in a political system 
rooted in social contract; that a society may learn of a breach of such a 
contract only by conscientious resistance to questionable 1 a ~ s . l ~ ~  While the 
political value of conscientious legal resistance does not require immunity 
from prosecution for the underlying offense,160 the educative function of civil 
153. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409, 3426 (1982). See generally A. 
Meiklejohn, Free Speech and its Relation to Self Government (1948); Brennan, The Supreme 
Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1965). 
154. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
155. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964); cf. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 
U.S. 563, 571-72 (1968) (public-issue-related expression weighed heavily in balancing). 
156. See generally G. Gunther, supra note 124, at  1108-1 1; Note, Constitutional Protection 
of Commercial Speech, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 720, 730-43 (1982). 
157. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is the right 
of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount."); Note, supra 
note 156, at 733-35. 
158. See R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 206-22 (1977); Leader, supra note 131, at  
420-25. 
159. Leader, supra note 131, a t  420-25. 
160. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); R. Dworkin, supra note 158, at 215; 
Leader, supra note 131, at 420-25. Both Dworkin and Leader recognize the problem of "free- 
riders"; those who would claim immunity from prosecution for civil disobedience when their real 
desire is to avoid shouldering their fair social burden. Professor Dworkin responds to this 
argument by reading civil disobedience as a challenge to the constitutional validity of the law; thus 
there can be no free-rider problem if the law is invalid. R. Dworkin, supra note 158, at  207-08. 
This approach, however, does not respond to the problem of distinguishing between would-be 
free-riders and conscientious violators if the law proves to be valid. Professor Leader would rely 
on enforcement, even against conscientious violators, as a means of discouraging "free-riders." 
Leader, supra note 13 1, at  424-25. 
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disobedience to the political process is defeated if the communication of such 
violations is chilled.lol For example, a democratic nation may vote to repeal a 
law when the body politic learns that those affected by the law are so morally 
opposed to it that they are willing to face penal sanctions rather than comply. 
The same law may not be repealed if the communication of moral outrage is 
chilled.le2 That selective prosecution can distort political communication, a 
form of speech that is highly valued, suggests that the speech interests will be 
especially weighty under the balancing analysis. 
2. Degree of Chill. - A number of Supreme Court cases suggest that the 
degree to which the neutral regulation chills the valued expression enters into 
the balancing process. For example, the Court found a "consequential, but 
uncertain, burden on news gathering" insufficient to override the public 
interest in law enforcement advanced by compelling newsmen to identify their 
sources.1e3 Similarly, the existence of alternative means of communication 
discounts the weight given a particular form of expression.lo4 The greater the 
degree of chill, the greater is the weight given the speech interest in the 
balancing test. In Thomas v. Collins,105 for example, the Court, finding 
significant chilling of protected speech, reversed a contempt sentence for 
violation of a temporary restraining order against soliciting union member- 
ships: "[tlhe threat of the restraining order, backed by the power of contempt, 
and of arrest for crime, hung over every word."loe 
The chill in Thomas resulted from the certainty of prosecution as a result 
of the exercise of protected speech rights. Similarly, in the selective prosecu- 
tion context, the degree of chill depends on the likelihood of prosecution of 
protected expression. At one extreme lies the situation in which vocal protest 
has no effect on the chances of selection, as where nonregistrants are discov- 
ered by matching social security and registration records, and violators are 
randomly selected for investigation and prosecution.1e7 In this situation, 
speech is not chilled at all. At the other extreme lies the situation in which the 
nonvocal violator is effectively immunized from prosecution,lo8 while only 
It may be argued that the conscientious violator deserves no first amendment defense to 
selective prosecution since his willingness to face the penalty is part of his communication. In 
response, the conscientious violator can argue that the penalty he is willing to face is that applied 
generally, not one applied specially to conscientious violators who communicate their protest. 
161. Ironically, Professor Dworkin advocates the use of prosecutorial discretion to not 
prosecute conscientious offenders as a means of encouraging such communication. R. Dworkin, 
supra note 158, at  217-19. 
162. For example, the intense political opposition to the Vietnam War, communicated in 
part by acts of civil disobedience, arguably led to this country's withdrawal from that conflict. 
163. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690 (1972). 
164. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 389 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
165. 323 U.S. 516 (1945). 
166. Id. at 534. 
167. See United States v. Wayte, 549 F. Supp. 1376, 1381 (C.D. Cal. 1982), rev'd, 710 F.2d 
1385 (9th Cir. 1983). 
168. See id. at  1384 (government admission that "the chances that a quiet non-registrant will 
be prosecuted is probably about the same as the chances that he will be struck by lightning"). 
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vocal violators are prosecuted. Passive enforcement has this result, and, 
accordingly, almost certainly will deter conscientious violators from commu- 
nicating the intensity of their views. Between these two extremes lies a middle 
ground, where both quiet and vocal offenders are sought out and prosecuted, 
but special attention is given to the prosecution of vocal offenders. The IRS 
enforcement policy provides an example.lB9 While expression of protest in- 
creases a tax protestor's chances of prosecution somewhat, such an effect may 
well be seen as a "consequential, but uncertain, burden"170 on expression, 
and, as such, be outweighed by the governmental interest in better law en- 
forcement through deterrence. This analysis suggests that if the government 
makes more than a token effort to prosecute nonvocal violators, the first 
amendment defense will not be available. 
2. Government Interests Asserted. - The analysis of the weight of the 
asserted speech interests indicates that the passive enforcement of draft regis- 
tration exerts a great degree of chilling on a highly valued form of speech. 
Such a policy may be justified only if it promotes a "strong, subordinating 
interest that the [government] is entitled to protect" and if such interests could 
not be "served by measures less destructive of First Amendment interests."171 
These two standards must be applied to the cost, deterrence, and evidentiary 
justifications offered for the passive enforcement p01icy.l~~ 
a. Cost Savings. -The cost savings of passive enforcement fail to justify 
its first amendment effects. In Schneider v. State,173 the Supreme Court struck 
down an ordinance barring distribution of handbills, noting that the extra cost 
of litter removal imposed by allowing handbill distribution did not outweigh 
the speech interests implicated. Thus, a minor cost differential does not justify 
an enforcement policy that selects only those who exercise first amendment 
rights for prose~ution. '~~ 
b. Deterrent Effects. - At first glance, the need for general deterrence in 
the enforcement of criminal laws seems to be a subordinating government 
interest sufficient to override the speech interests. On closer examination, 
however, the validity of the "deterrence" interest becomes doubtful, espe- 
cially in light of the availability of less restrictive alternatives to deterring draft 
nonregistrations. 
Deterrence is a form of government expression-a communication to 
would-be violators that the law will be enforced. Not every policy of enforce- 
ment that deters criminal conduct, however, advances a valid government 
interest. A policy of prosecuting only visible and vocal protestors of a law 
169. See United States v. Scott, 521 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1975) (vigorous IRS general 
enforcement policy). 
170. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690 (1972). See supra note 164 and accompanying 
text. 
171. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 636 (1980). 
172. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text. 
173. 308 U.S. 147 (1939). 
174. The fact that the Selective Service now uses an active enforcement program demon- 
strates that cost does not make such a system impractical. See supra note 1 .  
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should not be considered a legitimate form of deterrence. The government has 
no valid interest in protecting its citizens from accurate in f~rmat ion . '~~  A 
policy of selective enforcement designed to create the illusion of full enforce- 
ment of a generally unenforced law is destructive of the political process and 
serves no valid governmental interest. Consider a body politic lulled by a series 
of prosecutions of highly visible violators into the belief that an income tax 
law was strictly enforced. A self-governing nation might reenact the tax law 
without modification, in ignorance of large numbers of quiet violators who 
avoided their fair share of the tax burden. The "deterrence" illusion destroys 
the search for political truth that is vital to a representative democracy. 
Even if the deterrence goal is assumed to be validly aimed at communicat- 
ing the government's intention to enforce the draft registration law, less 
restrictive means are available to achieve this objective. The government relies 
on the publicity given to prosecutions of the visible, vocal protestor.170 Yet in 
the case of the first prosecutions under a new, controversial law, the govern- 
ment could easily draw media attention to any prosecution-including the 
prosecution of a quiet nonregistrant. Indeed, such a strategy may have a 
greater deterrent effect, since a pattern of prosecuting only vocal offenders 
may contribute to an accurate assumption on the part of would-be violators 
that they can ignore the law with impunity as long as they keep quiet. 
c. Evidentiary Value. - Reliance on first amendment-protected state- 
ments for their evidentiary value in establishing a knowing violation is in 
many respects a cost-saving measure. The government refuses to spend what it 
would take to establish a knowing violation without reference to protected 
expression. As such, this justification is subject to the objections voiced in 
Schneider: minor cost savings alone fail to justify the infringement of first 
amendment rights.177 In addition, one can easily imagine less restrictive alter- 
natives. For example, once nonregistrants are identified through ordinary 
administrative means, they could be notified by registered mail of their non- 
compliance; such notification could be used as evidence of their subsequent 
"knowing" failure to comply. Certainly, "knowledge" is no more difficult to 
establish for nonregistration than for other crimes for which passive enforce- 
ment has never been attempted. 
C. The Dismissal Remedy 
Given the degree of the burden on the protected first amendment interest 
and the inadequacy of the asserted governmental interests, a passive enforce- 
175. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 769-70 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 827-28 (1975); cf. Garrison v. 
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) ("honest utterance, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful 
exercise of the right of free speech"). 
176. See, e.g., United States v. Wayte, 549 F. Supp. 1376, 1384 (C.D. Cal. 1982), rev'd, 710 
F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Catlett, 584 F.2d 864, 868 (8th Cir. 1978). 
177. See supra note 173 and accompanying text; cf. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 529 
(1958) ("The State clearly has no such compelling interest at stake as to justify a short-cut 
procedure which must inevitably result in suppressing protected speech."). 
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ment policy that selects vocal violators for prosecution is inconsistent with the 
first amendment's guarantee of freedom of expressi~n. '~~ The Supreme Court 
has recognized that selective prosecution, in the proper circumstances, is a 
valid defense,17g and the circuit courts of appeals have so treated it by dismiss- 
ing cases against those who successfully establish selective prosecution.1s0 
Nevertheless, some commentators have criticized the dismissal remedy.lS1 
These commentators base their criticism on the perceived disutility of 
allowing an acknowledged offender to escape punishment. However, two 
arguments support the remedy of dismissal. First, a policy that infringes first 
amendment rights taints the statute, rendering prosecutions unconstitutional 
even if the underlying statute is otherwise valid. Viewed in this light, the 
nonregistrant has not violated a valid statute at all. Yick Wo suggests such an 
approach. The discriminatory application of the laundry permit statute ren- 
dered convictions under that statute invalid.ls2 Moreover, the offenders need 
not be immunized from prosecution and allowed to escape punishment. The 
same defendant can be prosecuted again under a valid enforcement policy.ls3 
The second argument for the dismissal remedy is based on the need to 
deter prosecutors from following policies that infringe first amendment free- 
d o m ~ . ' ~ ~  Such an argument draws support from the exclusionary rule, another 
situation in which acknowledged violators are released in order to deter 
government enforcement officials from violating constitutional provisions.1s5 
The deterrence rationale is even stronger in the case of selective enforcement 
than in the fourth amendment context. So few vocal violators are prosecuted 
that the societal costs of dismissal are vastly less than those associated with the 
exclusionary rule. Moreover, the selection policy itself indicates that the of- 
fense is not considered socially injurious, since the vast majority of violators 
are allowed to go unpunished. It is no more unfair to allow the thirteen 
178. Such a challenge does not raise a standing problem despite the fact that the defendant is 
claiming a chilling of first amendment rights while he has not himself been deterred. In the first 
amendment context, standing to challenge a government action for its chilling effects on the rights 
of others has been held to exist where the claimant is himself being prosecuted. Bigelow v. 
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809,815-16 (1975); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,458- 
59 (1958). 
179. See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962); Two Guys, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 
589-90 (1961); cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (release of prisoners convicted under 
statute discriminatorily applied). 
180. See, e.g., United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. 
Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1972). 
181. Abrams, supra note 84, at 52-53; Cardinale & Feldman, supra note 9, at 680-81. 
182. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); cf. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 529 
(1958) (part of statutory process invalid as against first amendment rights not separable from 
remainder of statutory provisions). See generally Comment, supra note 9, at 1105-22. 
183. Cox, supra note 84, at  406. A valid enforcement system is now used by the Selective 
Service. See supra note 1. 
184. See Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 199, 
229-32 (1982). 
185. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); Robinson, supra note 184, at  231; 
Comment, supra note 3, at  1131-33. 
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violators selected for prosecution to go free than to allow the 500,000 violators 
not so selected to go unprosecuted. Thus, the public policy in favor of 
enforcement does not outweigh the constitutional values served by dis- 
missal.186 
Federal courts currently apply a test that requires a defendant to establish 
a prosecutorial motive to deter or punish the defendant's expression in order 
to make out a first amendment selective prosecution defense. This motive 
requirement reflects the historical development of the selective prosecution 
defense, which is rooted in the equal protection analysis of administrative 
action. However, neither equal protection jurisprudence, nor the judicial 
deference traditionally paid to exercises of administrative discretion, justify 
requiring a showing of hostile motives as an essential component of a first 
amendment-selective prosecution defense. When prosecutorial policy is ap- 
plied in such a way as to disproportionately select those critical of the govern- 
ment, a court must apply either the test approporiate for content-based regu- 
lations or the balancing approach that is applicable whenever a general 
regulation incidentally infringes first amendment rights. Application of either 
approach reveals that passive enforcement policy such as the one previously 
used by Selective Service violates the first amendment. 
Karl S. Coplan 
186. See Comment, supra note 9, at 1140-41. 
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